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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Political business cycle (PBC) can be defined as fluctuations in the economy due 
to an attempt of a government to manipulate the economy prior to elections for 
favourable outcomes i.e. regaining its office. The concept of policy cycles gained a good 
deal of attention by the economists during mid 70s. Though most of the researchers 
attribute the PBC theory to Schumpeter (1939) and Kalecki (1943) but the seminal work 
in the theory of PBC is Nordhaus (1975).  
The literature on PBC sets these foundations for the topic:  
 (i) The incumbent politicians want to regain their office,  
 (ii) This requires how well the economy is doing especially at the time of election,  
 (iii) The incumbent politicians have, at their disposal, certain policy instruments, 
which at least partially determine the macroeconomic performance of the 
economy.  
Above-mentioned points state the intuitive plausibility of the idea that the 
governments attempt to manipulate the economy prior to the elections to have the office 
again. In addition, to above-mentioned points, believe in governments stabilisation power 
itself is believe in government’s power to destabilise.  
Traditional Approach investigates the uniform and systematic engineered business 
cycles for its belief in “similar incentives” for all incumbents to manipulate the economy 
at the event of all elections where as Rational Expectations Thesis rejects the possibility 
of PBC on the assumption of increasingly sophisticated ideas about the behaviour of 
voters else then the incumbent politicians [Schultz (1995)]. Yet both the models present a 
limited insight into the very foundation of theory of PBC. Away from intuitive 
plausibility of idea empirical record of the theory is spotty at best. A good deal of this 
spotty record may be due to different assumptions underlying the different empirical 
investigation [Whynes (1989)]. To resolve the dilemma one is required to revise the 
existing text first.1  
 
Muhammad Shahid Akram <msakram71@hotmail.com> is currently enrolled as a PhD student at 
Bhauddin Zakariya University, Multan. Toseef Azid is Fulbright Fellow at Social and Behavioural Sciences 
Division, El Camino Community College, Torrance, CA, USA.  
1For comprehensive details on the exiting literature, one may consult Alesina, et al. (1991), Alesina 
(1992), and Drazen (2002).  
Akram and Azid 914
Till its birth the literature on political business cycle has attracted a good number 
of researchers. The early spotty record of empirical investigation caused a many 
economists to ignore the topic for further inquiry despite of the intuitive plausibility of 
idea [Schultz (1995)]. On the other hand the interest of many economists kept on refining 
the intellectual fabric of the literature on political business cycle. The basic model of 
PBC developed by Nordhaus (1975) along with the preceding development in the theory 
of political business cycle.  
The existing literature on PBC can be categorised under two headings: the 
Opportunistic PBC theory [Nordhaus (1975)] and the Partisan theory of PBC [Hibbs 
(1977)]. The literature on PBC can be classified further as: the monetary PBC and the 
Fiscal Approach to PBC. The story starts with Nordhaus (1975), who proposed a model 
of political intervention to create a pre-election boom for harvesting the election 
outcomes favourably. Later, Hibbs (1977) proposed the influence of party affiliation on 
polices adopted by the incumbent president towards the aim of being re-elected. The said 
theories tried monetary variables for empirical investigation. Both models based heavily 
on the notion of a retrospective or myopic voters or simply an irrational voter who can be 
fooled easily every time. This shortcoming led to the emergence of the concept of 
Rational Expectations in the PBC literature. Cukierman and Meltzer (1987) developed a 
model of PBC based on Rational Expectations. Alesina (1987, 1988) developed a 
Rational Partisan Theory. The fourth generation of PBC models is driven by Rogoff’s 
model of Political Budget Cycles (1990). Rogoff’s model evidently emphasized the 
power of fiscal instruments on behalf of an incumbent in engineering a business cycle. 
The most recent version of a Political Budget Cycle Model is Active Fiscal and Passive 
Monetary (AFPM) model of Drazen (2000).  
Alesina (1989), Alesina and Roubini (1990), Cohen and Roubini (1991), Alesina 
(1992) argues for rational models to analysis politically motivated manipulation of the 
economic policies. Alesina and Roubini (1992) regressed OECD countries quarterly data 
during 1960 to 1987 on GNP growth, unemployment and inflation against election 
timings and of changing of governments and political affiliations of different 
governments for implications of both types of models: OPBC and RPT. They concluded 
that most recent models performed more rigorously. Beck (1988) argues that normally a 
clear OPBC is not observed because it is exceedingly hard to time economic 
manipulation. Dinkel (1981) rejects the presence of OPBC in Germany. Dinkel deems the 
theoretic of OPBC plausible, yet empirical investigation rejected the possibility of OPBC.  
The present study, first of its breed, aims to explore any possibility of politically 
motivated business cycles in Pakistan. More precisely do incumbents- politicians, 
technocrats or military Lords- ever tried to manipulate the economy prior to elections for 
favourable outcome, in Pakistan through the history. The study will employ the 
Opportunistic Political Business Cycle (OPBC) approach for this purpose, where OPBC 
stands for the absence of party affiliation of the incumbent. The data on the Real Money 
Supply (RM) and Real Exchange Rate (ER), from 1973-Q1 to 2005-Q4 will be used for 
the present analysis as dependent variables and the election timings will be the cause 
variable.2  
 
 
2A table of election timing is given in Appendix A. 
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2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
The Nordhausian theoretic of PBC (1975) or more specifically the Opportunistic 
Political Business Cycle is the first seminal work in the theory of PBC and still remains 
one of the most frequently investigated concepts of the literature on PBC. This traditional 
approach to measure any politically motivated manipulation of the economy is 
undoubtedly not only easy to employ but also rigours in its results especially in 
developing world context. Though the relatively modern approaches to PBC investigation 
promise some deeper analysis of the topic, but on the same time these call for relatively 
sophisticated data, which is normally either not collected or highly non-reliable in most 
of the developing nations on account for unavailability of funds, skilled working force in 
the field and most seriously non-respondent public.  
 
2.1.  Assumptions of Nordhaus’ Political Business Cycle3  
 (1) An expectations- augmented Philips Curve describes the economy  
 (2) Voters are retrospective and myopic  
 (3) Expectations of the voters are adaptive  
 (4) Politicians are opportunistic  
 (5) They control certain policy instruments  
 (6) The timings of elections are exogenously fixed.  
Yet the case of Pakistan differs from Nordhausian assumption of exogenously 
fixed election timings. In Pakistan, the case of premature democracy- if we consider a 
very less number of publicly elected governments and civil and military dissolution of 
governments- the election timings are not exogenously set. To include endogenously set 
election timings in the model the research will follow Lachelar (1982), Ito (1990) and 
Asutay (2004) who used the notion of endogenously set timings for elections under 
certain reasoning such as:  
 (1) Early election calls to reap good economic conditions  
 (2) Early election calls for increasing function of high economic growth  
 (3) Non-imposition of fixed time of election by laws or constitution.  
Yet there are studies, for example Nordhaus (1975), Paldam (1979 and 1983), Soh 
(1986) etc. investigating OPBC model in various cases without making the setting of 
election date as a particular issue.  
 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODELLING AND SPECIFICATIONS 
To estimate OPBC of Nordhaus type in monetary instruments, the coming lines 
will summarize the model and specifications.  
 
3.1.  Modelling  
The study will employ Box- Tiao intervention analysis [Box-Tiao (1975)] to 
capture any manipulation of fiscal policy prior to elections for favourable outcomes or to 
 
3For details see Nordhaus (1975), Alesina and Roubini (1992), Alesina, et al. (1993, 1997), Drazen 
(2000) and Asutay (2004). 
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find if election timings bear additional explanation of fluctuations in the monetary policy 
instruments as suggested by Beck (1982, 1987).  
 
3.2.  Capturing the Impact of Elections  
Beck (1982 and 1987) on the basis of Box-Tiao’s (1975) intervention analysis 
suggests following standard dummy variables to capture the impact of election timing on 
the policy instruments which are also known election dummies: the standard electoral 
dummies and their respective definitions are as follow:  
 ED1 = 1 in the election quarter  
  = 0 otherwise  
 ED2 = 1 in one quarter prior to an election and election quarter  
  = 0 otherwise  
 ED3 = 1 in two quarters prior to an election and election quarter  
  = 0 otherwise  
 ED4 = 1 in three quarters prior to an election and election quarter  
  = 0 otherwise  
 ED5 = 1 in three quarters after an election  
  = 0 otherwise  
The dummies defined above aim for capturing any possible significance of the 
election timings on the economic policy. In brief ED1 stands for impact of elections on 
economic policy right before the elections i.e. the election-quarter itself. ED2 bears some 
extra explanation of effects of elections i.e. it aims on capturing the impact of elections 
on economic policy one quarter before an election on the assumption that the election 
may held in the start of the election quarter or the incumbent aims on timing the 
manipulation of the policy towards election eve. ED3, by including the time of two 
quarter prior to election shares the responsibility of ED2. ED4 shares the same 
responsibility, as by its predecessors, in three quarter prior to an election. Where as the 
dummy ED5 stands to capture the expected down fall of the economy due to engineered 
boom via policy manipulation for reaping the election outcome.  
 
3.3.  Expected Signs of the Dummies Introduced  
The coefficients of the dummies explained above on the basis of Box-Tiao’ (1975) 
intervention analysis have the following expected signs which are best possible 
approximation to capture the said intervention.  
Coefficient of ED1 should be a positive for a PBC to present  
Coefficient of ED2 should be a positive for a PBC to present  
Coefficient of ED3 should be a positive for a PBC to present  
Coefficient of ED4 should be a positive for a PBC to present  
Coefficient of ED5 should be a negative for a PBC to present  
 
3.4.  The Data and the Source of the Data  
The series are constructed as follows. The real exchange rate is the relative 
inflation adjusted exchange rate, and is constructed by multiplying the nominal exchange 
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rate by the ratio of consumer price indexes (e.g. RER=(PAK/USA)*(CPI US/CPI PAK). 
The real money supply series are obtained by deflating the money supply series with the 
consumer price indexes; CPIs are converted into common base of 1995. Prior to the 
estimation all variables are transformed into natural logarithms. Data span from 1973-Q1 
to 2005-Q4, providing series of 132 observations. All the series are obtained from 
international financial statistics (IFS) up to 1998; from 1998 to 2003 the series are 
obtained from statistical bulletin of government of Pakistan, finance division.  
 
3.5.  Limitations on the Data  
As the present study is based on secondary data, so one should keep in mind the 
limitations on data in developing countries like Pakistan, where meagre resources are 
employed to generate data. The situation presented above leads to many problems such as 
non-reliability, limited availability, unavailability of data for sophisticated analysis etc. 
The problem of limited availability of quarterly data, which is highly important to capture 
the impact of elections on economic variables, is one of the major hurdles for present 
study, which has limited the time of study from 1973 to 2005.  
 
3.6.  The Politico-economic Models  
In general form the Politico-economic or even more relaxingly the economic 
models for both the dependent variables are:  
 
3.7.  Real Money Supply (RM) and Election Timings  
RMt = f (RMt-i , ED1, ED2, ED3, ED4, ED5; âi)  … … … (5.1)  
Where RM is supply of real money in the economy, ED1 to ED5 are the standard 
electoral dummies and âi’s are the unknown parameters associated with independent 
variables in the model.  
 
3.8.  Real Exchange Rate (ER) and Election Timings  
RE t = f (Ret–i, ED1; âi) … … … … … … (5.2)  
Where ER is real exchange rate, ED1 is the standard electoral dummy and âi’s are the 
unknown parameters associated with independent variables in the model.  
 
3.9.  The Hypotheses  
In the following line, hypothesis in both null and alternative forms is presented.  
H0: The incumbents in Pakistan did not manipulate the economic policy tools for 
political motives i.e. for favourable outcomes in elections.  
H1: The incumbents in Pakistan manipulated the economic policy tools for 
political motives i.e. for favourable outcomes in elections.  
 
4.  ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION 
The first step in the estimation of a model with time series data is to ensure the 
stationarity of the series involved as more of the macroeconomic time series follow a 
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long-run trend. The implication of this long-run trend would be the invalidity of the 
significance test applied on OLS estimates [Price (1998)], for this purpose Unit Root test 
is employed to the both series. The results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller for Unit Root test 
of the Real Money Supply and the Real Exchange Rate series suggest that each series is 
stationary of the first difference. One must remember that before applying unit root test 
the natural logarithm for each of the series is developed. On the basis of the results of 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller the study is modelled into Auto Regressive Moving Average 
(ARMA), whereas AR(1) is utilised as more parsimonious benchmark model following 
Gujarati’s advice (2005).  
The results for all models are reported in Appendix B. The slope coefficients of 
variables responsible for capturing the possible political intervention in forming 
economic policy in all the models bear the required positive signs for the presence of a 
politically motivated business cycle, which according to Box-Tiao’s (1975) intervention 
analysis are signs of politically motivated manipulation of economic policy in the 
respective quarters, as mentioned earlier. But all the results failed to qualify the 
significance test, which leads to the rejection of idea of presence of PBC in Pakistan. The 
one exception for the required signs is the result of the model 5, which contains electoral 
dummy ED5, the sign of the slope coefficient of ED5 must be a negative according to the 
Box-Tiao’s (1975) intervention analysis for presence of a PBC. Yet the sign of this slope 
coefficient is positive which suggest the absence of PBC, but this result too, is not 
statistically significant which indicates an arise of little anomaly which is contradictory to 
the results of other models estimated by the study. The four estimations of the RM model, 
else than that of the model with electoral dummy ED5, and the estimation of the RE 
model have rejected the presence of PBC in Pakistan for the insignificant results. in the 
light of these results, though a little loosely, the study recognizes an overall rejection of 
the idea of presence of a politically motivated business in Pakistan, as on the basis of one 
spot in favour of the presence of PBC, the other five results, which are in contrast of this 
single result, can not be rejected.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Though the intuitive plausibility of the idea of politically motivated intervention in 
economic policies enjoys high esteem in common as well as critical intellect yet the 
present study could not find any traces of politically motivated manipulation of economic 
policy or political business cycle in Pakistan during the span of time selected for 
investigation. As reported earlier that some of the signs of slope coefficients suggest the 
symptoms of manipulation of economic policy yet the results could not qualify the 
regarding test for significance of the estimates. One of the strongest reasons for rejection 
of, intellectually strong, idea is itself the political history of Pakistan. Pakistan could 
never enjoy a politically stable scene in its life.4  Time and again it has been under non-
elected rules, which has caused the political behaviour in Pakistan to be immature. 
Although economic policy tools seems to be attractive in regaining political power or 
office but the rulers in Pakistan seem to be using some other tools for being in office or to 
regain their office. The limited nature of the present study doesn’t allow for some other 
 
4For a review of Pakistan’s political and economic history, the study relied heavily on Sadik (1997), 
Burki (1998), Khan (2005), Zaidi (2005). 
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dimensions of enquiry such as Rational Expectations thesis, Partisan Theory of PBC, 
Equilibrium Political Budget Cycle Theory, AFPM Model etc. Yet the study opens up 
new horizons to evaluate and investigate, critically, the interplay of economics and 
politics in Pakistan with its history and limitations on its past such as unavailability of 
data or to devise the tools for using available data set etc. This also requires some 
empirical techniques to be developed for investigating the data type available in Pakistan 
and other developing countries facing similar limitations in the field of data availability. 
One recommendation in light of the present investigation is that political process must be 
given proper time to make itself mature and interruption in political process must end 
now. This is not to say to give a way to politicians to make the economy unstable on their 
political desires that is to regain their office or to stuck with the office unlawfully but to 
say that a smooth political scene can help the country enjoy a calm economic and social 
scene.  
 
Appendix A 
Table 1 
A Table of Election Date in Pakistan* 
20 December, 1971 4th quarter 
February, 1977 Ist quarter 
19 December, 1988 4th quarter 
February, 1985 Ist quarter 
November, 1988 4th quarter 
October, 1990 4th quarter 
October, 1993 4th quarter 
February, 1997 Ist quarter 
October, 2002 4th quarter 
*The table is developed by the authors with the help of different sources, which are mentioned in the 
bibliography. *It must be remembered that all the general elections as well as referenda, over the time under 
investigation, are included in the study  
Appendix B 
Table 2 
Autoregressive RM and ER, 1973Q1-2005Q3 
Dependent Variable: Logged RM (NLRM)  
Logged ER (NLER)*  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. 
Constant 0.338852 2.784465 0.338073 2.758874 0.327069 2.728233 0.349769 2.898397 0.338095 2.789474 0.024520 0.793988 
NLRM(1) 0.955416 64.79810 0.955535 64.15002 0.957684 65.94241 0.953487 65.15040 0.955504 65016894   
NLER (1)           0.989200 108.2485 
ED1 0.004003 0.113094         0.006148 0.473764 
ED2   0.000796 0.029354         
ED3     0.042278 0.598632       
ED4       0.032258 1.238707     
ED5         0.004918 0.132392   
Diagnostic Tests 
R2 0.975733 0.975730 0.976301 0.976076 0.975734 0.991107 
AIC –1.720858 –1.720746 –1.744561 –1.735109 –1.720903 –3.72010 
SBC –1.646784 –1.646672 –1.670487 –1.661035 –1.646829 3.646337 
F-stat 2131.020 2130.775 2183.406 2162.368 2131.118 5906.741 
DW 2.227034 2.225260 2.191022 2.156685 2.224813 1.813939 
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis.: t-statistics; R2 : Coefficient of Determination; AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat: F-Distribution 
Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics. 
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Comments 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis of political business cycles due to Nordhaus (1975). 
The political business cycles are described as fluctuations in the economy caused by the 
incumbent government’s manipulations prior to elections in order to regain office.  Using 
Box-Tiao intervention analysis to capture manipulations of fiscal and/or monetary policy 
prior to election, the paper does not find support for this hypothesis in the case of 
Pakistan for the time period 1973-2005.  
My main worry is that these Western-based theories may not be applicable to the 
Pakistani case. The political business cycle theory implies very subtle manipulations, 
through various policy instruments at the disposal of the government. Pakistan has a 
different political history with altogether different modes of intervention and tactics by 
the government to regain office. Pakistan has experienced very direct modes of 
government intervention—the nationalisation experiment of the Bhutto regime; and also 
very ambitious programmes by various democratic regimes to woe the voters (the 
People’s Programme, the Yellow Cab Scheme). There is nothing subtle about these 
schemes. Successive Pakistani governments have also been accused of trying many 
illegal ways to regain office-election engineering, results manipulations etc. Though the 
authors take notice of the fact that Pakistan has had a political history of being ruled by 
non-elected rulers, and also that the government must be using different tools to regain 
office, it would be interesting to see if the authors come up with an ‘indigenous’ method 
of analysis that better suits the case of Pakistan. 
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